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ABSTRACT 
Realism, as Michael Dummett understands it, is a thesis about the meanings 
of sentences of a natural language. The Realist's thesis is that the correct 
model of meaning for those sentences is a truth-conditional one. Dummett 
has sought to prove that Realism thus defined faces insuperable objections. 
Those objections centre around the communicability of the Realist"s truth-
conditions - how, when these truth-conditions are ones that can obtain 
without spealcers being aware that they do, could spealcers possibly evince 
in their linguistic behaviour an understanding of those conditions? 
This thesis is an attempt to meet Dummett's arguments against Realism. 
In the first chapter, I outline Davidson's form of Realism, ultimately 
disagreeing with his views on the nature of mind (§§1.1.2, 1.4), but 
endorsing his holistic approach to meaning, truth and interpretation. 
Meaning for Davidson is a theoretical notion, underdetermined by linguistic 
usage. Central to Davidson's position is the belief that truth is primitive, a 
belief which Frege argued for. I argue that Frege and Davidson are right 
about this and that this doctrine is inconsistent with a correspondence 
theory of truth (§1.2). 
The second chapter sets oui Dummett's Anti-Realism, noting Dummett's 
requirements for acceptable theories of meaning. With one reservation, I 
accept Dummett's characterisation of Realism (§2.1 ). Dummett thin.ks that 
our use of language is guided by implicit knowledge of a theory of meaning 
for our language (§2.2), our grasp of all sentences, in particular the 
undecidable sentences, consisting in a grasp of their assertibility conditions. 
Essentially defeasible statements present a problem for Anti-Realism (§2.4). 
I then present Dummett's Manifestation Argument against Realism, 
questioning some central assumptions of that argument (§2.4). I conclude the 
chapter with a discussion of Dummett's objections to holistic theories of 
meaning- some of these are cogent, but others are based upon 
misunderstandings, I contend (§2 . .5). 
In chapter three, I critically discuss Dummett's idea that truth is a construct 
from the more primitive notion of correct assertibility. I argue that 
Dummett's formulation of the latter notion is unsatisfactory (§3.1.1) and that 
his most convincing argument for truth's arising from assertibility, which is 
based on our understanding of time and tense, does not, even if sound, prove 
what he needs to prove if he is to create problems for Realism (§3.1.2). I 
then examine Dummett's reasons for holding that a theory of meaning must 
il 
contain a subpart which pairs truth-conditions with practical recognitional 
abilities on the parts of speakers (§3.2). I argue that first person avowals or 
others require a truth-condtional model for their meanings (§3.3 ). With this 
as a counterexample to a global Anti-Realist semantics, I seek to show that 
Dummett's Manifestation Challenge can be answered provided one can 
rebut Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument. 
Although I do not investigate whether it really does so, I suppose with 
Dummett that Wittgenstein's argument entails that meaning must be 
exhaustively manifest in use. I took at the most cogent form or this 
argument, which is due to Saul Kripke in the final chapter. I contend that 
Kripl::e's semantic scepticism is self-refuting (§5.2). · 
The penultimate chapter seeks to examine the intuitionistic foundations of 
Dummett's Anti-Realism. I begin with a discussion of the intuitionist's 
philosophical position, attending particularly to his views on quantification 
over infinite totalities (§4.1 ). Dummett and Dag Prawitz have developed a 
proof-theoretic approach to the meanings or the logical constants (§§4.2,4.3). 
Dummett uses a generalised version of the proof-theoretic notion of a 
conservative extension to press for revision in our Realist-inspired logical 
practices (§§4.2,4.5). I examine and reject the most persuasive form of the 
argument for revisionism (§4.5.1 ). I argue that theories of meaning based 
upon the notions of assertibility or deniability cannot explicate the meanings 
of the logical constants (§4.4)- to do this, the Anti-Realist must develop an 
acceptable theory of truth; in this connection, Dummett's suggestions are 
inadequate (§4.:S). I conclude the chapter with a discussion of Dummett's 
ingenious attempt to justify deduction (§4.6). This is Dummett at his very 
best and here I argue that, somewhat in contrast to the overall tenor of my 
other conclusions, Dummett is absolutely right. 
ill 
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